This Article presents a case study of how constitutional actors respond when the rule of law and necessity are sharply at odds and
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional leaders must mediate the tension between the rule of law and the law of necessity. 3 Thomas Jefferson, who made the Louisiana Purchase in spite of serious concerns about its legality, once wrote that -[a] strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.‖ 4 Abraham Lincoln defended his unilateral suspension of habeas corpus at the beginning of the Civil War by asking, - [a] re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?‖ 5 And law students are typically introduced to the Supreme Court with a lesson on how Chief Justice John Marshall balanced principle and politics when he established judicial review and pontificated about the importance of civil remedies as he denied William Marbury a remedy in order to avoid a damaging confrontation with the President. 6 One recent constitutional necessity argument came during the 2011 debt ceiling standoff between the House of Representatives and President Barack Obama. Faced with the prospect that the Treasury might be unable to borrow more money, some prominent figures, including former President Bill Clinton, urged the President to issue debt without congressional authorization and prevent a default on federal bond payments. 7 They argued that Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that -[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned,‖ gave the President this power in an emergency, though others claimed that he could act on his own based on the -necessities of state, and on the [P]resident's role as the ultimate guardian of the constitutional order.‖ 8 A deal was struck before the debt ceiling was reached, but this question may again become relevant the next time the debt level approaches the ceiling established by Congress.
To explore how constitutional actors think through claims of legality and pragmatism under tremendous stress, this Article examines the Gold Clause Cases, in which the Justices rejected various challenges to the devaluation of our currency during the 1930s and to the invalidation of contracts denominated in predevaluation gold dollars. 9 New Deal historians compare the Court's handling of Perry v. United States, 10 the case on the abrogation of the gold clause in federal bonds, to Marbury v. Madison because Perry headed off a showdown with the Executive Branch by ruling that the bondholders were not entitled to damages even though their rights were violated. 11 Notwithstanding that intriguing parallel, most lawyers know nothing about Perry.
12 This is a glaring omission from professional lore, because that case-along with the companion decision of Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 13 which upheld the abrogation of gold clauses in private contractspresented two branches of government with a difficult necessity question at the same time.
14 Moreover, Perry is the only Supreme Court case that talks about Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus is highly relevant to any future debt ceiling debate.
In a recent article, Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin explained that there are many types of constitutional crises. 15 A -type one‖ crisis 12. Perry was the subject of some major law review articles in 1935. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1057; see also John P. Dawson occurs when -leaders publicly claim the right to suspend features of the Constitution in order to preserve the overall social order and to meet the exigencies of the moment.‖ 16 -Type two‖ crises, by contrast, -arise from excess fidelity, where political actors adhere to what they perceive to be their constitutional duties even though the heavens fall.‖ 17 Perry was at the center of both a type one and a type two crisis. In the event of an adverse decision by the Supreme Court, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was ready to give a speech stating that he would not comply because doing so would lead to an economic catastrophe. 18 Meanwhile, the Justices struggled with what to do since deciding Perry based on their best interpretation of the Constitution-that the United States could not devalue its own debt-would lead to chaos. 19 The intense pressure on the Court was reflected in its unprecedented decision to announce on two occasions that its opinions in the Gold Clause Cases would not be issued at its next session. 20 By recounting how the President and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes-the author of the plurality opinion in Perry-dealt with the crisis, the dark arts of constitutional law are exposed in a way that raises deeper questions Article. See id. (-Type three crises involve situations where publicly articulated disagreements about the Constitution lead political actors to engage in extraordinary forms of protest beyond mere legal disagreements and political protests: people take to the streets, armies mobilize, and brute force is used or threatened in order to prevail.‖).
16 ROOSEVELT 87-88 (1995) (discussing the President's thinking on this issue); JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 99 (2010) (stating that FDR's draft -was a declaration of independence, of sorts, from the system of checks and balances‖).
A comparison of the draft address in the files of the FDR Library and the one reproduced in a published collection reveals some minor differences. I am going to treat the latter as authoritative because it is more easily accessible to researchers and because the choice does not affect my analysis. In addition, I cannot establish which of the two versions is more accurate. 
A. The Election of 1896
It is impossible to understand how the constitutional debate over the gold standard unfolded without reviewing Bryan's -Cross of Gold‖ speech during the 1896 Democratic National Convention. 24 At that point, there was no doubt that Congress possessed the power to create a monetary system. 25 In Juilliard v. Greenman, the Court held that this choice was a political question that could not be reviewed by the courts. 26 Bryan called on Congress to increase the coinage of silver, which would expand the money supply and aid farmers who were suffering from years of deflation in commodity prices.
27
The -Cross of Gold‖ speech made free silver the defining issue of the presidential election. Bryan told the delegates that if Republicans -ask us why we say more on the money question than we say on the tariff question, I reply that, if protection has slain its thousands, the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands.‖ 28 He added that -[i]f they ask us why we do not embody in our platform all the things that we believe in, we reply that when we have restored the money of the Constitution all other necessary reforms will be possible; but until this is done there is no other reform that can be accomplished.‖ 29 This was the basis for Bryan's ringing line that -we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them, You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold. Put another way, while Congress retained the power to abolish the gold standard, only a political mobilization on the scale of what occurred in the 1890s could make that happen.
The most visible sign of this constitutional reliance came in private contracts and in Treasury bonds, which were drafted with a standard provision stating that the creditor would be repaid in gold dollars. 34 Typically, this boilerplate provided that any debts would be -payable in principal and interest in United States gold coin of the present standard of value,‖ which referred to the value at the time the contract or bond was executed. 35 Many scholars see the inclusion of this language as security in case Congress ended the gold standard, 36 but that description is incomplete. While gold clauses were a hedge against devaluation, they were also an expression of the prevailing consensus on the role of gold in the monetary system. 37 of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain such parity.‖).
32. 34. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 98 (-For many years lawyers had used with the regularity of a ritual a clause by which their contracts and mortgages, even farm and home mortgages, simply declared in substance that they were immune from the effect of any use Congress might find it necessary or expedient to make of its constitutional power to regulate the value of money.‖).
35. SHLAES, supra note 22, at 157; see also 
B. The Great Depression
The settled expectations surrounding gold were upset by the Crash of 1929. As the financial panic deepened, many countries dropped the gold standard, which caused the dollar to appreciate and put the United States at a trading disadvantage. 38 Furthermore, the deflation that accompanied the economic decline crippled debtors who found their obligations growing in value while their incomes were falling, which was the same vicious cycle that had motivated the -Cross of Gold‖ speech in the 1890s. 39 41. See Glick, supra note 9, at 804 (-The Government attempted to invigorate the economy by inflating the depressed paper currency to increase circulation and activity.‖); see also SHESOL, supra note 18, at 93 (stating that this -was part of a complex, interlocking set of policies designed to create inflation‖).
The abolition of the gold standard was also a necessary prerequisite to the adoption of Keynesian economics, as deficit spending to stimulate demand could not be done on a massive scale if the nation was required to maintain ample gold reserves. Congress sell their gold to the government. 42 Shortly thereafter, Congress gave the President the authority to cut the dollar's gold weight, which he did in January 1934. 43 Finally, the Gold Reserve Act ordered virtually all gold coins smelted into bullion-a credible sign that gold would not be back in circulation anytime soon. 44 These efforts to reverse deflation would be for naught, however, if the contracts and bonds that included gold clauses were enforced. Congress therefore passed a Joint Resolution declaring that these gold clauses were unenforceable. 45 The Joint Resolution stated: -[E]very provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold . . . or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy.‖ 46 Furthermore, -[e]very obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred . . . shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.‖ 47 Finally, Congress made it clear that this abrogation included both private contracts and Treasury bonds. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone vowed that he would never buy another federal bond. 54 Justice Benjamin Cardozo was also uneasy, but told a friend that - [t] here is room for a lot of immorality within the confines of the Constitution and of constitutional law.‖ 55 And these were the Justices who were sympathetic to the New Deal.
At the same time, others were attacking the Administration for not going far enough. Father Charles E. Coughlin, a Michigan priest who had a tremendous radio following, urged the President to adopt the solution that was rejected in 1896-the remonetization of silver.
56 He argued at one point that the dollar should be backed by seventy-five cents of silver and twenty-five cents of gold, and went on to call for the abolition of the Federal Reserve and its replacement by a central bank petitioner's argument that -[t]he Federal Government is one of enumerated delegated powers‖ and therefore -[i]f no power to impair contracts is granted, it is difficult to see how the power can be derived‖).
50. See Norman, 294 U.S. at 250 (stating respondent's submission that -[p]rivate individuals may not ‗by prophetic discernment,' through contracts previously entered into, any more than by contracts subsequently made, withdraw from the control of Congress any part of its legislative field or limit or obstruct the exercise of its powers‖); see also Perry, 294 U.S. at 350 (quoting the Government's view that -earlier Congresses could not validly restrict the 73rd Congress from exercising its constitutional powers to regulate the value of money, borrow money, or regulate foreign and interstate commerce‖).
51. This Article does not discuss Nortz v. United States, which was the third gold clause decision alongside Norman and Perry. Nortz presented the issue of whether someone who redeemed gold certificates (i.e., notes payable in gold coin) pursuant to the redemption order was entitled to compensation based on the market price of gold abroad or on the lower price set by the Treasury. See Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1935). The Court held that because Congress had banned the gold trade in the United States, the market price was irrelevant for the redemption rate. See id. at 330 (-Plaintiff insists that gold had an intrinsic value and was bought and sold in the world markets. But plaintiff had no right to resort to such markets.‖).
52 controlled by an elected representative from each state. 57 The Nation denounced Coughlin's proposal as -based upon the theory that the imbecility of the plain people is usually greatly underestimated.‖ 58 Although Father Coughlin was an effective rabble-rouser, the real political threat to the President came from -The Kingfish‖-Huey P. Long. 59 The charismatic Senator from Louisiana complained that -[w]e are practically the only country in the world to-day that has not remonetized silver,‖ 60 and that the Treasury was controlled by -the [J.P.] Morgan House.‖ 61 In 1934, Senator Long announced the creation of the -Share Our Wealth‖ movement, which contended that the cure for the Depression was the redistribution of wealth. 62 Millions answered Long's call and joined clubs dedicated to the cause, where they got a copy of his autobiography, his Senate speeches, and a subscription to his newspaper at no charge. 63 This was a prelude to Long's planned presidential campaign in 1936, in which he would take on Roosevelt for the Democratic nomination or as a third-party candidate. 64 The President and his aides took that threat seriously, and this looming contest may have influenced Roosevelt's thinking about how to act if the Supreme Court invalidated the Joint Resolution.
C. Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment
Another argument made against the abrogation of the gold clauses in Treasury bonds relied on Section Four (the Public Debt Clause) of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this provision was at the heart of the recent debt-ceiling battle, that issue deserves some extra attention. The parties in Perry agreed that Section Four applied to the national debt issued after the Civil War, but they disagreed about the scope of that principle. The United States maintained that the Public Debt Clause barred only a total repudiation of federal bonds. This interpretation rested in part on the meaning of the word -validity‖ in Section Four, which the Government read as referring -to the essential existence of the obligation.‖ 67 Moreover, the legislative history backed this view, because the main concern during Reconstruction was that the South would refuse (following their readmission to Congress) to honor the debts racked up by the Union during the Civil War. 68 Furthermore, none of the cases addressing changes to the value of legal tender (for example, the composition of the dollar or its convertibility into gold) said anything about Section Four. That was telling because some of those changes diminished the value of government bonds. 69 As a result, the United States maintained that the -absence of any reference to Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment in any case involving the question of the constitutionality or interpretation of the Legal Tender Acts tends to indicate the fact that no one considered that the validity of a debt was questioned by changing the medium of payment.‖ Neither position is entirely persuasive. The view that only a total repudiation violates Section Four would impose no real limit on federal authority, as Congress could decide to meet .01% of bond payments and still be acting lawfully. On the other hand, the failure of the bondholders to answer the point about the validity of the Legal Tender Acts was instructive. Not all devaluations of public debt are unconstitutional. The best way to reconcile these positions is that the Public Debt Clause bars the federal government from substantially defaulting on its bonds. A short suspension of debt payments-as was threatened during the 2011 debt ceiling debate-would probably not meet this standard, especially if the bondholders were made whole when payments resumed. A longer delay, or one where retroactive payments were not made, though, could violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 Unfortunately, no Justice commented on the Section Four issue at oral argument, and the Court did not forge a majority position in its Perry opinions.
D. The Oral Argument
When the Court took up the challenges to the gold clause abrogation, the Administration found itself on the defensive. Robert H. Jackson, who was a lawyer in the Treasury Department at the time, later dismissed the argument for discussing -precedents, such as the argument based on the ancient custom of kings to ‗clip' coins, [ Presidents are often unhappy with the Justices. When that happens, the standard response from the Executive Branch falls into one of three categories. First, the President can note his disagreement with the Court but follow the decision without further comment. Second, he can comply but denounce the Court and seek to blunt its opinion through a new statute or a constitutional amendment, which was President Obama's response to the Citizens United 89 decision on campaign finance regulation. 90 Third, a President can acknowledge that nothing can be done about the decision in the short run, but later wield the opinion as a political argument in favor of confirming justices with a different interpretive philosophy.
Roosevelt did not approach the Gold Clause Cases in the usual manner, because he was convinced that he could not afford to follow Perry or Norman (the challenge to the gold clauses in private contracts) if either came out the wrong way. As Robert H. Jackson later said: -The President was greatly concerned about the possible outcome . . . and was quite determined that he just could not accept an adverse decision.‖ 91 In part, FDR's reluctance was due to the predicted financial impact of a gold clause restoration, as described by the Attorney General at oral argument.
92 Equally important, however, was the political cost of enforcing such a ruling. At a time when he was taking extraordinary steps to stop Huey Long, Roosevelt could not give the Kingfish a golden opportunity to tie the Administration to Wall Street. 93 Consequently, the President had to find a way to influence the Court's pending decision or develop a strategy that would win public support for openly flouting its holding. 98. There is an analogy here to President Jefferson's refusal to allow James Madison to appear before the Court in Marbury, which sent an unmistakable signal that the wrong decision would not be enforced. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 60 (-Madison, on direct orders from President Jefferson, had refused even to respond to the Court's show cause order, making clear their shared contempt for the entire Marbury proceeding.‖).
99. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 11, at 257 (-On January 14, Roosevelt actually told Morgenthau that he wanted the Treasury to keep things as unsettled as possible while the Court was making up its mind.‖); SHESOL, supra note 18, at 98 (-The sense of crisis, Roosevelt said, would prompt average citizens to say, ‗For God's sake, Mr. President, do something about it.' And ‗if I do,' Roosevelt concluded, ‗everybody in the country will heave a sigh of relief and say thank God.'‖).
Morgenthau refused and hinted that he might resign, Roosevelt said, -Henry, you have simply given this thing snap-judgment. Think it over.‖ 100 The next day, with no indication that Morgenthau would change his mind, the President retreated and explained that he was just floating the idea to clarify his thinking--but of course,‖ he said, -I didn't believe in those arguments.‖ 101 His explanation (of course) was implausible, especially since word just happened to get out that Roosevelt had told Joseph P. Kennedy, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to close the financial markets if the Justices struck down the Joint Resolution.
102 Perhaps this information was not intentionally given to the press, but that seems unlikely.
If the Court did not heed these warnings and decided against the Government in Perry, Roosevelt settled on a plan to ignore the opinion until a statute invoking sovereign immunity to bar gold bondholder suits was enacted.
103 Robert H. Jackson was the source of the sovereign immunity idea, and an emergency decree was drafted ordering that no payment be made according to a gold clause in any contract for ninety days. 104 The legality of this decree was far from obvious, but Congress could always have retroactively blessed such a move. That -shoot first, ask questions later‖ approach is one way to resolve the inconsistent demands of law and necessity. After all, Congress arguably authorized Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus after the fact. 105 ] contended, saying there would be no change in the monetary policy, and the demanders of gold payments could do nothing about it. He suggested that Congress might even ignore such a decision and refuse to appropriate funds to meet the spread between the face value of its bonds and the value in terms of the devalued currency.‖).
104. See JACKSON, supra note 76, at 65-66 (explaining his advice to Roosevelt); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 18, at 87 (describing the draft order); see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934) (upholding Congress's power to use sovereign immunity to extinguish remedies for a breach of a federal contract). The availability of sovereign immunity supports the view that the President could have the power to unilaterally prevent a violation of Section Four under some circumstances. The alternative remedy would be a suit from the bondholders demanding payment, but Congress can erase that claim (albeit only with a twothirds majority in each House if the President objects). If there is no other way to prevent the Public Debt Clause from being trampled upon, then the President may have the power to act. That scenario, though, is far-fetched.
105. See Tyler, supra note 5, at 637-39 (describing the events leading up to the enactment of the suspension legislation in 1863); Tyler, supra note 5, at 639 (observing that the statute straddled the issue of whether Congress authorized the President's actions or was declaratory of won in Norman, though, the President's decree would have been illegal. In that scenario, Congress would have lacked the authority to prohibit debt-collection suits in state and federal courts. Thus, the President would need a really convincing explanation for his radical course of action.
B. The End of Judicial Supremacy-The Draft Fireside Chat
On February 9, 1935, Roosevelt summoned some of his advisors and dictated a speech -for use if needed.‖ 106 Though minor changes were made in the editing process, the final draft was substantially the same as what the President dictated. 107 After reading the speech to Morgenthau, Roosevelt noted that Joseph P. Kennedy believed that -the statement is so strong they will burn the Supreme Court in effigy.‖
108
Let us now turn to the text of this undelivered radio address.
109
As one might expect, the President spent most of his time emphasizing the necessity of abrogation, since the enforcement of gold clauses would bring about -universal bankruptcy.‖ 110 Debtors expected to pay back and creditors expected to receive, Roosevelt stated, -the same kind of dollars with approximately the same purchasing power‖ as those loaned at the time that they entered into their contracts.
111 Allowing creditors to get a substantial windfall because of subsequent deflation would thus be -unconscionable‖ and -would automatically throw practically all the railroads of the United States into bankruptcy.‖ 112 Worse still, many homeowners, municipalities, and other firms with debt obligations would face default. 113 While this disaster would be traceable to the wrong decision in Norman, Roosevelt also claimed that a holding in Perry, making the gold clauses in Treasury bonds binding, would force Congress to raise taxes and put -125,000,000 people into his authority to act).
106. See SHESOL, supra note 18, at 99. 107. Id. at 99-100 (-The draft, over the coming days, made the rounds among a small circle of officials, accumulating small revisions but not changing much in substance.‖).
108. SCHLESINGER, supra note 11, at 258. 118 They start by stressing the unthinkable consequences of inaction, then offer another reading of the disputed law-in this case, the idea that the proper construction of gold clauses would give the parties dollars around the same value as when they struck their bargain. They conclude by invoking the duty to protect the nation from these devastating ends. The most plausible source for that necessity duty is the Commander in Chief Clause, but even an eager apologist for executive power could not stretch that provision to cover monetary action in peacetime. 119 As a result, the President needed an external source of authority to justify his departure from settled law.
Roosevelt's answer was to draw on the Bible. The President argued that the principle holding that - [f] continue, until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‗the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.'‖).
127. See supra text accompanying note 16. I will not speculate about whether public opinion would have sustained the President. It is not obvious, however, that he would have lost. 
III. THE COURT FINDS AN EXCUSE
This Part assesses the Supreme Court's disposition of Perry after considering how Justices react when they realize that their best reading of the Constitution is not politically viable. Chief Justice Hughes avoided a clash between law and necessity by reaching back to Marbury and holding that Treasury bondholders had a right to be paid pursuant to their gold clauses, but could not get a remedy. 130 His reasoning, much like Chief Justice Marshall's, was widely ridiculed, with Judge Learned Hand going so far as to say that Perry -[made him] puke.‖ 131 But in both instances the resulting opinion proved critical for upholding the integrity of the constitutional scheme by avoiding a damaging interbranch collision and preserving judicial authority.
A. Backing Down and Saving Face
The Justices often face the prospect of making a disruptive decision. When that is true, the Court can take several paths. One involves just issuing the opinion and taking the heat. Another is to blink and overrule (either expressly or sub silentio) precedent that is inconsistent with the popular constitutional interpretation. 133 There is also the option of avoiding a controversial decision through a clever reading of the law, though at some point that becomes implausible. 134 Finally, the Justices 128. See Catledge, supra note 85, at 1 (-Official Washington remained convinced tonight that a decision would be forthcoming tomorrow from the Supreme Court on the gold-clause cases.‖); infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
129. See SHESOL, supra note 18, at 104. 130. Perry never refers to Marbury, perhaps to avoid any embarrassing comparisons. 131. SCHLESINGER, supra note 11, at 260. 132. See Glick, supra note 9, at 814; infra text accompanying notes 165-68 (attacking the logic of Perry). For a sample of the critical reviews of Marbury, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 63 (-Marshall ignored settled legal rules in such a fashion as to suggest that it was politics as much as law driving him.‖); Tushnet, supra note 6, at 543 (-The logic of Marshall's opinion is, as every student of the case knows, hardly iron-clad.‖); infra text accompanying notes 136-41 (discussing Marbury). The founding text for the right-remedy gap is Marbury, which is rich given that that opinion accepted that the essence of civil liberty is that rights and remedies are linked.
136 Almost every lawyer is aware of Chief Justice Marshall's challenge in that case. President Jefferson would almost certainly have refused to follow a judicial order giving Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace. 137 Turning that into a holding that Marbury was not legally entitled to the office, though, would have been a betrayal of the rule of law. As a result, Marshall concluded that withholding the commission was -an act deemed by the court not warranted by law,‖ but held that Marbury could not get relief through a writ of mandamus in the Court's original jurisdiction because Congress could not enlarge the original jurisdiction granted in Article III to include mandamus. 138 There is no need to repeat the standard criticisms of Marbury here, as the important point for its comparison to Perry is how Chief Justice Marshall's opinion was organized. First, he tried to mask the impotence appellate jurisdiction from the Court on the assumption that an alternative path was available); ACKERMAN, supra note 94, at 223-27 (pointing out that McCardle involved a highly charged constitutional attack on the military occupation of the South and that the Court could have, but chose not to, issue its opinion on the merits before the repeal statute came into effect). Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 1019-20 (-Ambiguous acquiescence is possible only when the agent's alternative explanation for its acquiescence is credible . . . . Over time, acquiescence will become less ambiguous and, eventually, unambiguous.‖). Chief Justice Roberts's opinion interpreting the individual mandate as a constitutionally valid tax even though the relevant provision says that the failure to comply with the mandate leads to a -penalty‖ could be seen as another example. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. of the Court by delivering a long lecture about why it was improper for the Executive Branch to retain Marbury's commission. 139 Second, he gave a tortured explanation for why the Court could not give a remedy for this legal violation, which involved the deliberate distortion of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
140 Third, the Chief Justice did a great service to the rule of law generally, though not for Marbury personally, by shielding the Court from political retribution when it was vulnerable.
141
More than a century later, Chief Justice Hughes would repeat this feat in much the same way.
B. The Perils of Perry
Before delving into the Gold Clause Cases, something must be said about the unique way in which the opinions were handled. On February 2nd, the Clerk of the Court issued the following statement:
The Chief Justice, in order to avoid an unnecessary crowding of the court room on Monday, directs the clerk to announce that the court is not ready as yet to announce a decision in the gold clause cases and hence there will be no announcement on that day.
142
That was the one and only time in Supreme Court history that an update was given on a pending case. 143 A week later, on the same day that the President dictated his speech, the Clerk made a similar statement.
144
One week after that, though, no statement was issued, which was the signal that the opinions were coming. 145 The Justices clearly understood the importance of the moment.
The Norman decision about gold clauses in private contracts was relatively straightforward. 146 Writing for a 5-4 majority, the Chief Justice declared that - 148. See Norman, 294 U.S. at 304-05; see also Waxman, supra note 36, at 2416 (-With respect to private contracts, the government was in the position of a disinterested third party. Congress had no commercial stake in invalidating gold clauses in private contracts. Instead, it acted as an unbiased sovereign seeking to control the value of currency and to prevent private contracts from undermining that effort.‖).
149. Norman, 294 U.S. at 307; see id. at 308 (pointing out that if interstate contracts provide for rates that Congress later outlaws, then the contracts are not enforceable); id. at 309 (making the same point about anticompetitive contracts). This decision built on one from the prior year, decided by the same 5-4 majority, which held that mortgage contracts could not bind state legislatures. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 446-47 (1934) (rejecting a Contract Clause claim against modifications to foreclosure procedures).
150. Norman, 294 U.S. at 311; see id. at 316 (-We think that it is clearly shown that these clauses interfere with the exertion of the power granted to the Congress, and certainly it is not established that the Congress arbitrarily or capriciously decided that such an interference existed.‖).
With respect to Treasury bonds, though, a plurality of the Court in Perry held that the Joint Resolution was unconstitutional. 151 The Chief Justice, writing for himself and three others, rejected the notion that -Congress can disregard the obligations of the government at its discretion, and that, when the government borrows the money, the credit of the United States is an illusory pledge.‖ 152 He said that - [t] here is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution confers.‖
153
In essence, the plurality reasoned that the language in Article I, Section Eight, giving Congress the authority to -borrow money on the credit of the United States‖ meant that one Congress could bind future ones with respect to bonds.
154
This conclusion, the Chief Justice added, was supported by the Fourteenth Amendment's language about the validity of public debt. Hughes said the following about Section Four:
While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. We regard it as confirmatory of a fundamental principle, which applies as well to the government bonds in question, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to those issued before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we perceive any reason for not considering the expression -the validity of the public debt‖ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations. modern debt ceiling issue is that this discussion is dictum. Moreover, this dictum was undercut by the Court's decision not to give a remedy to the injured parties. With his discussion of Congress's power, the Chief Justice reprised Marbury's jeremiad on the rule of law to establish a credible predicate for folding on the remedy. 156 While his opinion was strong, Hughes gave an even more theatrical performance in the courtroom. A witness said that his reading of Perry scolded the Government -in a voice that sounded like that of a Secretary of State rebuking Latin American banana republics for their repudiations.‖ 157 The propriety of this discussion was dubious since the Court was about to conclude that no relief could be granted, and hence the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction to hear Perry's case-a criticism that echoes the one made about Marbury's unnecessary discourse of the merits.
158 Nevertheless, the dicta on the bondholder's rights may have been necessary to hold the plurality together and make its retreat look like something other than a rout.
159
When the opinion turned to damages, though, Perry did an aboutface and held that the bondholders were entitled to nothing. The key to Hughes's argument was that Congress had withdrawn all gold coin from circulation. 160 As a result, the -[p]laintiff's damages could not be assessed without regard to the internal economy of the country at the 156. See Glick, supra note 9, at 814 (-Why go to all the trouble to condemn the Government and tackle unnecessary questions in the first half of Perry before digging out of that hole in the second? The most logical explanation is that the first half represented sincere and strongly held opinions, and the second reached the necessary outcome.‖).
157. UROFSKY, supra note 11, at 697. 158. See Hart, supra note 2, at 1096 (-[T]he Court violated two of its most frequently repeated canons of constitutional decision. It decided a constitutional question when it was not necessary to do so; and it permitted that question to be raised by a litigant who was able to show no interest in its outcome.‖); see also Perry, 294 U.S. at 355 (explaining that -the Court of Claims has no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages‖); supra note 138 (discussing Marbury).
159. See Dawson, supra note 12, at 658 (-The opinion of Chief Justice Hughes seems at first sight to be strangely inconsistent. An opportunity is seized to announce a proposition in constitutional law whose meaning is distinctly doubtful, and which has no bearing on the immediate decision.‖). Chief Justice Roberts's opinion upholding the individual mandate did something comparable by addressing (and rejecting) the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause arguments on the merits before pivoting and accepting the Tax Clause argument. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600-01 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (attempting to explain why the commerce and necessary and proper discussions were not dicta). In Perry and Sebelius, a reasonable case can be made that the Chief Justice was paying lip service to a legal fiction-that Congress cannot repudiate national debt or does not have a police power-before coming down with a contrary result in practice.
160. See Perry, 294 U.S. at 355-56; supra text accompanying notes 41-44 (discussing the statutes that restricted gold). time the alleged breach occurred. . . . A free domestic market for gold was non-existent.‖ 161 The -[p]laintiff demands the ‗equivalent' in currency of the gold coin promised. But ‗equivalent' cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used.‖ 162 And the legal value of that gold was the (devalued) face amount of the bond, because any gold in private hands had to be sold to the Treasury at that fixed price. 163 Therefore, there was no compensable harm. 164 This reasoning was (at best) shaky, because it overlooked the fact that a gold clause was guaranteeing a level of value, which was widely known, rather than the gold itself. 165 165. See Waxman, supra note 36, at 2418 (-It has been rightly pointed out that this reasoning is not entirely persuasive.‖); see also Glick, supra note 9, at 813 (-The logic of the majority's opinion is strained. It initially interpreted the bonds as contracts for ‗gold value,' security against inflation. . . . Once the Court wrote that the clause obviously was intended to afford protection against loss, the fact that Perry could not avail himself of a market for actual gold is an unsatisfying solution.‖ (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
166. Hart, supra note 2, at 1074. Anyone interested in Perry should read Professor Hart's entire article, which tears the plurality's reasoning to shreds.
167. Glick, supra note 9, at 814. 
CONCLUSION
The standoff between the President and the Justices in the Gold Clause Cases was a dry run for their fight just two years later. When Roosevelt gave an actual Fireside Chat defending his plan to pack the Court, he made the close call in Perry and Norman the opening salvo of his argument. He said that when he came into office, the country was in the throes of a bank panic, and -we asked the nation to turn over all of its privately held gold, dollar for dollar, to the government of the United States. Today's recovery proves how right that policy was.‖ 183 But -[t]he change of one vote would have thrown all of the affairs of this great Nation back into hopeless chaos. In effect, four Justices ruled that the right under a private contract to exact a pound of flesh was more sacred than the main objectives of the Constitution to establish an enduring Nation.‖ 184 In response to this speech, Chief Justice Hughes again wrote the key opinions that accommodated the New Deal and saved the Court, though this time the resulting legal change was more obvious. 185 Now we come to the final, and most tantalizing, question. What if the Court had stood its ground in Perry? While the answer requires a fair amount of speculation, two points seem clear. One is that a ruling restoring the gold clauses, even one quickly nullified by a sovereign immunity law, would have made the currency question more salient in national politics. 186 The 1930s would have looked more like the 1890s. Furthermore, an extended debate on the gold standard in 1935 would have taken at least some of the wind out of other congressional priorities, most notably Social Security, with repercussions that we cannot fully grasp.
The other thought is that a repudiation of the Court would have altered the balance of forces between the White House and the Justices. Since Congress could turn to a statutory remedy to thwart an adverse decision in Perry, the long-run effect of that precedent on judicial authority probably would have been minimal. At that time, though, such a severe putdown might have made the Justices more reluctant to stand in the way of other New Deal legislation. If not, then the foes of Courtpacking would have been in a weaker position in 1937. A Court that had already been overruled once by the elected branches on an issue of vital importance may not have commanded the same level of respect.
The lesson of the Gold Clause Cases is that necessity is just one layer of the rule of law. In other words, a necessity argument is not beyond the reach of legal analysis. What makes necessity distinctive is that it is not grounded in doctrine. Nevertheless, lawyers can still test logic that draws exclusively from history, structure, text, or even religion. Mistakes come only when those making a necessity claim abandon that kind of careful examination.
APPENDIX: ROOSEVELT'S GOLD SPEECH 187
Two years ago the welfare of all our citizens in every section of the United States was endangered by increasing bankruptcies and bank failures. In the short space of the previous three and one half years the purchasing power of the dollar had increased about sixty per cent. This meant that debtors of all kinds, individuals, associations, institutions, corporations, municipal, county, state governments and the Federal Government itself, were being called on to pay their creditors in currency worth sixty per cent more in purchasing power than the money which had been loaned to them.
When the debts were originally incurred, the lender expected to get back the same kind of dollars with approximately the same purchasing power that he had loaned. The borrower expected to pay back the same kind of dollars with approximately the same purchasing power that he had borrowed. That was the essential understanding in every contract for the repayment of money loaned.
But on the day of my inauguration, any attempt to collect in substance one hundred and sixty cents for every dollar owed would have brought universal bankruptcy.
During the past twenty-three months we have moved rapidly toward establishing and maintaining a dollar of stable purchasing power. We have brought about present dollar value which is within twenty per cent of what it was when the majority of debts, private and governmental, were incurred. All of our legislation of the past two years has been aimed at creating a currency of sound and standard purchasing power and then maintaining it.
In working toward our broad objective, the American currency was first taken off what is commonly known as the Gold Standard. Later, by Act of Congress and by Presidential Proclamation, it was restored to a gold standard on a different weight of gold.
The decisions of the Supreme Court are, of course, based on the legal proposition that the exact terms of a contract must be literally enforced.
Let me for a moment analyze the effect of the present decision by giving a few simple illustrations:
187. The text reproduced in the Appendix can be found in Gold Speech, supra note 18, at 456-60.
First, in the case of the railroad bonds: Regardless of whether maturing bonds are owed by a bankrupt railroad or a solvent railroad, the bondholder is by this decision entitled to demand that the railroad pay him back, not the $1000 which he paid for the bond, but-$1690. Yet when he bought that bond he did not expect to get a clear net profit of $690 in addition to the sum of $1000 which he had invested.
It is unconscionable, not only for the individual investor to reap such a wholly unearned profit, but also to impose such a burden on shippers, travelers and stockholders. In fact, if the letter of the law is so declared and enforced, it would automatically throw practically all the railroads of the United States into bankruptcy.
Second: The principle laid down today in the railroad case applies to every other corporation which has gold bonds outstanding, driving many another huge enterprise into receivership! It must be applied likewise to the obligations of towns, cities, counties, and states; and these units of government, now working bravely to meet and reduce their debts, would be forced into the position of defaulters.
Third: Consider the plight of the individual who is buying a home for himself and his family and paying each month a specified sum representing interest and reduction of the mortgage. If there is a gold clause in his mortgage-and most mortgages contain that clause-this decision would compel him to increase his payments 69% each month from now on, and perhaps to pay 69% more on some payments already made. Home owners, whether city workers or farmers, could not meet such a demand.
Consider now the other two decisions relating to government obligations on gold notes, gold certificates and gold clause bonds. An old lady came to see me the other day. She is dependent heavily on the income from government bonds which she owns; and her total income is about $800 a year. She owns $10,000 of government gold clause bonds. Under this new decision she would be entitled to ask the Treasury for $16,900. Being the right type of citizen, she volunteered to tell me that she does not consider herself entitled to more than the $10,000 which she had saved and invested.
The actual enforcement of the gold clause against the Government of the United States will not bankrupt the Government. It will increase our national debt by approximately nine billions of dollars. It means that this additional sum must eventually be raised by additional taxation. In our present major effort to get out of the depression, to put people to work, to restore industry and agriculture, the literal enforcement of this opinion would not only retard our efforts, but would put the Government and 125,000,000 people into an infinitely more serious economic plight than we have yet experienced.
Finally, I again call attention to the fact that the total of debts secured by contracts containing a gold clause amounts to at least one hundred billion dollars which is a very large proportion of our total property value of all kinds. To meet this contract debt, there exists in the United States a total of about eight and one half billion dollars of gold and in all the rest of the world-Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the Americas-there is not more than twelve billions in gold.
I do not seek to enter any controversy with the distinguished members of the Supreme Court of the United States who have participated in this (majority) opinion. They have decided these cases in accordance with the letter of the law as they read it. But it is appropriate to quote a sentence from the First Inaugural Address of President Lincoln:
-At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between the parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.‖ It is the duty of the Congress and the President to protect the people of the United States to the best of their ability. It is necessary to protect them from the unintended construction of voluntary acts, as well as from intolerable burdens involuntarily imposed. To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried through to its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the economic and political security of this nation that the legislative and executive officers of the Government must look beyond the narrow letter of contractual obligations, so that they may sustain the substance of the promise originally made in accord with the actual intention of the parties.
For value received the same value should be repaid. That is the spirit of the contract and of the law. Every individual or corporation, public or private, should pay back substantially what they borrowed. That would seem to be a decision in accordance with the Golden Rule, with the precepts of the Scriptures, and the dictates of common sense.
In order to attain this reasonable end, I shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary, by proclamation and by message to the Congress of the United States.
In the meantime, I ask every individual, every trustee, every corporation and every bank to proceed on the usual course of their honorable and legitimate business. They can rest assured that we shall carry on the business of the country tomorrow just as we did last week
